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ONE YEAR 
AFTER
T he author, who was a mem ber of the delegation of the 
Com m unist Party of Australia to the International Con­
sultative m eeting of Comm unist Parties held in Budapest 
in February, visited Israel dn his way home. H ere he dis­
cusses the situation in that country and in the M iddle East 
a year after the June war.
T H E  JU N E  W AR IN  T H E  M IDDLE EAST has no t solved Israel’s 
problems, it has m ade them more serious. Israel’s security is not 
greater than before Jun e  5th. Peace is not nearer. T he  border inci­
dents continue, w ith heavier clashes and loss of life. In  Israel right- 
wing forces are m ore firmly entrenched. T he atmosphere in the coun­
try is one of reliance on force, of “ teaching the Arabs a lesson”. T he 
appetite for foreign conquest is growing. T here  is som ething of a 
cult of Dayan. T h e  whole country is moving to the right. Voices 
are heard, and increasingly listened to, which talk of the “right to 
hold the land which we conquered by our arm s”.
T he Israeli governm ent acts in defiance of w orld opinion—the 
m ilitary parade through the occupied areas of Jerusalem  in May 
was an example. Israel is losing some of the support and good will 
th a t it had earlier. Some sections of the left in the W est which 
had tended to sympathise with Israel when Arab voices were heard 
calling for Israel’s destruction, are revising their attitude, repelled 
by the in transigent a ttitude of the Israeli governm ent.' For despite 
all the talk about its desire for a peace settlement, the governm ent 
is pu tting  forw ard demands which it knows to be unrealistic and 
which no Arab leader could possibly accept. It deliberately refuses 
to clearly state its territorial settlement terms. At the same time 
responsible governm ent leaders, such as the M inister of Defence 
(Ha’ aretz, January  19, 1968) talk of “ the Jordan river as a border 
of security of Israel”.
T he th inking beh ind this was revealed by the Prim e M inister 
Levy Ashkol when he said on the eve of his visit to W ashington 
(28th December 1967)—“W ho knows if we will not have to rem ain 
another 20 years, maybe more, inside the border of the cease-fire 
lines, which are m uch more natural, stronger and more bold and
57
AUSTRALIAN LEFT REVIEW June-July, 1968
give us much more outlook in to the future and m uch more hope”. 
Such statements belie the professed desire for a just peace. For those 
on the left, the post-June developments in  Israel must be extremely 
disturbing. L.ike the June war itself these developments are con­
nected with the policies pursued by the Israeli establishment for 
the last 15 years.
W hat is happening today has to be seen in its setting. It has a 
history and it, like the June war itself, cannot be understood 
outside of its development. T he establishm ent of the Jewish 
state of Israel in 1947 by decision of the U nited Nations was the 
direct result of the terrible tragedy th a t had befallen the Jewish 
people in Europe during the Nazi occupation. Six m illion Jews 
were killed systematically and in cold blood in what was the most 
monstrous operation of its kind in all hum an history. Europe was 
repaying a debt to the survivors of this tragedy. But the establish­
ment of a Jewish state in a country populated by another people, 
the Palestinian Arabs, was bound to create problems.
After all, as Arab spokesmen have often said since, the Arabs 
were not the ones responsible for the crimes com m itted by Europeans 
against the Jewish people. In  fact, Jews had lived for centuries 
in Arab lands in complete peace and harm ony among the Arab 
population. It seemed to them that Europe was paying its debt 
to the Jewish people at the expense of the Arabs. If an historical 
claim 2000 years old has m eaning to Jews, having lived in the 
country for generations has also m eaning for the Arab population in Israel.
So difficulties were bound to arise: the question was how they 
were to be met. If a Jewish state was to flourish in the midst of 
this Arab world, which in the m eantim e was awakening and 
dem anding its national independence, it had to find a way to live 
with it. Those circumstances dem anded of the leaders of Israel 
a sincere attem pt to find an accommodation with the awakening 
Arab movement. T here were very real difficulties of course. Reac­
tionary Arab feudal rulers, working in  league with foreign im per­
ialist powers denounced the state of Israel. O ften the more subser­
vient they were to the W estern powers, particularly  to the oil 
interests, which dom inated the area economically, the louder were 
their attacks on Israel. It became a means of diverting the 
atten tion  of their own people to a foreign enemy. Arab reactionaries 
acting in  behalf of im perialist interests had in fact attem pted to 
prevent the establishm ent of tTie state of Israel by force in 1948. 
But w ith the developm ent of Egyptian revolution in 1952 a real 
possibility arose to find an accommodation with Egypt, the most 
im portan t Arab country.
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W hen a group of young Egyptian officers overthrew King Farouk 
in  July 1952, they were m otivated by a desire to rid  the country 
of British colonial rule and to free it of the general corruption 
which had grown up  around that rule. They were not preoccupied 
with the Palestine question. King Farouk had started the 1948 
war and left the Army fire blank bullets, the cash difference 
went into his pocket. T o  get rid of British colonial rule, which was 
still in control of the country and the Suez Canal, was their aim 
—not an attack on Israel.
Nasser became the leader in 1954. He pursued a neutralist 
foreign policy, attem pted to free the country of British dom ination 
and to gain control of the Suez Canal. Nasser actively attem pted 
to find an accomm odation with Israel. T he  war of 1948 had left 
a heritage of over one m illion Arab refugees, which Israel had 
steadfastly refused to do anything about. But with the retirem ent of 
the hard line Prime M inister Ben G urion in  December 1953 and 
his replacem ent by Moshe Shareff, who was a m oderate who was 
looking for a political settlem ent with the Arab countries, a real 
possibility existed of finding a solution to the Israel-Arab conflicts. 
As contacts were established between Nasser and Shareff, the hard 
line forces in Israel led by Lavon, the M inister for Defence, and 
Moshe Dayan, the Chief of Staff, did all they could to prevent the 
attem pts at rapprochem ent.
T he  Israeli Security Service was instructed to send Israeli 
agents in to  Egypt to carry out acts of sabotage against W estern 
property which would be blam ed on the Egyptians. T h is is how 
this episode is now openly described in a recently published best 
seller in Israel Eli Cohen, Our M an in Damascus, by E. Ben H anan, 
pp. 24-25:
It had happened at th e  end of the summer of 1954. Inform ation arriving 
from London caused Israeli leaders a considerable am ount of worry. It 
seemed th a t the elderly C hurchill under Egyptian pressure—accompanied 
by frequent acts of terrorism —had decided to w ithdraw  the British forces 
from their bases in  the Suez Canal area. For the ru ling  ju n ta  ip Egypt this 
was a considerable accom plishm ent, bu t as far as Israel was concerned a British 
presence in  the canal area was vital.
. . . T he best solution seemed to be a series of sabotage attem pts and open 
provocations, to be carried ou t by h ired terrorists, secretly trained  in sabotage 
and espionage since 1951 by Israeli agents. Some of the terrorists had even 
received “scholarships” for advanced train ing in Israel, which they had reached 
via France . . . they were divided in to  two groups, Cairo and Alexandria.
. . .  In the m onths of May Ju n e  1954, Israel decided to activate the group deci­
sively. Instructions were received at the H eadquarters calling for sabotage in 
public buildings, cinemas, post offices and railroad stations. T h e  m ain target was 
to be British institutions such as libraries, cultural centres, houses owned by 
British citizens, and the British legation in Egypt. T he aim —to bring Britain 
to the conclusion th ta  it was still early to pull out of Egypt and th a t all guarantees 
offered by the Egyptian governm ent in exchange for evacuation of the bases, 
were ineffective in the light of the continuing wave of terrorism .
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It led to the arrest and execution of two Israeli agents in Egypt. 
O ther efforts, not all yet revealed by any means, were made to 
aggravate the tension between Israel and Egypt.
T he  Israel Security Service which played a m ajor role in these 
operations, is regarded as a most efficient organisation. T his is how 
it has been described by General Von Horn, the Chief of U.N. 
Observers Staff in the Middle East:
T he Israeli Secret Service has no equal in the M iddle East in collecting 
inform ation an d  special operations. It recognises no sovereignty o ther than  its 
own, and lacks all inhibitions in its activity. Aided by an almost complete 
security blackout in its own coupntry, it also knows th a t it is supported by 
practically every citizen of Israel, from the Prime M inister on down to the 
man in the street. And it enjoys the fru it of its penetration  into practcally 
every secret service in the world.
T he  W estern oil interests then as now did not want a settlement 
of the conflicts between the peoples in the area. In  fact Britain 
and France planned to get rid of Nasser who was adopting an 
increasingly independent attitude. An alliance with the hard line 
forces in  Israel was carefully constructed. T he  next vital step in 
this tragic chain of events took place on February 28, 1955— 11 
days after Ben G urion returned from retirem ent to the office of 
Israel’s Defence M inister. It was the Israeli attack on an Egyptian 
garrison near the armistice border in the Gaza Strip, three miles 
into Egyptian territory, in which 43 people were killed. As Jean 
Lacoutiere describes it in his book, Egypt in Transition, “T he 
Israeli attack on February 28 cannot bf com pared w ith the previous 
acts com m itted on both sides, and it opens a new phase— that of a 
sizeable m ilitary operation in a zone which has long been living 
in a state of insecurity”.
Certainly Egypt saw this as the victory of the “h ard ” line in 
Israel. Nasser is on record as seeing it in  this way. I t led to his 
fateful decision to  form the commandos, the fadayeen which were 
recruited am ong the refugees in Gaza, and tra ined  in  sabotage. T his 
seriously aggravated the situation between Egypt and Israel. But 
even after th a t Nasser made another attem pt to  reach a settlem ent 
with Israel. T hrough  Dom Mintoff, who was then  Prime Minister 
of M alta, contacts were established in  Janu ary  1966 and a secret 
meeting between Nasser and Israeli representatives was planned for April in M alta.
As soon as the British got wind of this they d id  their best to 
prevent peace. 7  he plans for the Suez cam paign had been made. 
T he dom inant hard line leadership in  the Israeli governm ent acted 
in the same way. Israel’s colfusion in the Suez aggression against 
Egypt established her in the eyes of the A rabs as a W estern 
agency in the M iddle East. It made the task of finding a lasting peace in the area more difficult.
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It is not difficult to understand why W estern oil interests, with 
their enormous profits from the exploitation of the M iddle East 
should do everything possible to destroy the movement for national 
independence or to keep up tensions between Jews and Arabs in 
the area. But what of the people of Israel? Have they not suffered 
enough? Do they not want to live in peace and security in their 
owTn land? T his is certainly the popular sentim ent, bu t the people 
who run the country have different aims.
T he Israeli ru ling  class has long-range and well prepared plans. 
They involve conquering territory and “clearing” it of its in hab i­
tants. They are based on an alliance with the W estern interests 
in the M iddle East. T o  carry them  out requires skilful efforts to 
deceive its own people, to aggravate tension with its A rab neighbors 
and to bring up the youth in  a spirit of hostility towards the Arabs. 
T he ruling class m ade good use of the chauvinistic elements in 
the Arab movement, to create an atmosphere in  Israel of a people 
surrounded by enemies bent on its destruction. They were helped 
by Arab extremists.
T he  Israeli ru ling  class is very skilful—it has learned well from 
the experiences of the ru ling  classes of other countries. One of 
the most surprising impressions one gets in Israel is the m anipulated 
public opinion about the Arab national liberation movement. T he 
public is shown only its m uddy streams, its chauvinistic and dem a­
gogic elements. Nasser is presented as simply another H itler. But 
the creation of this picture is im portant for the fulfilm ent of the 
aims of the Establishment.
Last year a lecturer at the T el Aviv Uuniversity, Dr. George 
T am arin, conducted a survey of students in  7th and 8th grades of 
the Tel Aviv Prim ary School (13 to 14-year-olds) about the attitude 
to the Arabs. He asked them about some passages in  the book of 
Joshua (which is compulsory study) according to which the 
invading armies at the “com m and of G od” destroyed whole towns 
and villages and killed all inhabitants, including women and child­
ren. One of the questions to these 13-14-year-olds was: “If today the 
Israeli Army conquers an Arab village or an Arab town, do you 
consider it correct that it should act according to the behest of 
Joshua and kill all the inhab itan ts”? T he horrifying results showed 
that 66% of the students answered the question in  the affirmative. 
Typical replies were: T he  Arabs are our arch-enemies, it is necessary 
to kill them, because they can’t be trusted and will otherwise 
kill Jews, etc. E ight per cent were partly in  agreement, bu t had 
reservations and 26% opposed on hum anitarian  grounds, or because 
it would damage Israel’s reputation  in the eyes of the world. T he  
academic who had criticised the chauvinistic education and its
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results was dismissed from his post. T h is happened only a few 
months before the June war.
T he Israeli public, for all its sophistication, its high level of 
education, its interest in  politics, is astonishingly ill-informed on 
matters pertaining to Israel and its Arab neighbors. T here is no 
doubt the overwhelming m ajority of the population of Israel 
supported the June war. They believed th a t the country was fighting 
for its existence and the people for their survival. T he  threats by 
Arab extremists to destroy Israel played the m ain part in this 
conviction. T he  experience of the destruction of the six m illion 
Jews in Europe during the Second W orld W ar has left a deep 
scar on Jewish consciousness. Some of the rem nants of this holocaust 
are in Israel. Many of them  lost members of their family during 
the war. Such people are naturally very sensitive to the threat of 
destruction, no-m atter how empty such threats may have been.
The Israel ruling class managed to use the traum atic experiences 
of the Jewish people for their own purposes. I t served them as a 
means to unite the country and lead it in to  the June war. I t made 
full use of the irresponsible and disgraceful statements of Arab 
chauvinists and demagogues which called for the destruction of 
Israel and m ade threats against the people of Israel. I t deepened 
the feeling among the Jewish population of being surrounded by 
enemies bent on their destruction. But whatever the ordinary people 
believed, and were made to believe, the m ilitary and political leaders 
of the country knew perfectly well that there was no threat to Israel. 
They knew the state of the Egyptian Army, they knew that Nasser 
tried to avoid a conflict, that he was no t in  a position to fight, 
that he was bluffing. They knew of the secret efforts by Nasser 
to find a peaceful way ou t of the crisis. T hey knew of the concessions 
he offered to reach a peaceful settlement.
B ut they h id  all this from their people. T hey  fed them on biased 
and one-sided inform ation. They highlighted all the aggressive 
statements and suppressed the conciliatory ones. They planned 
and prepared for this war well ahead. T he  blunders and miscalcu­
lations of Nasser as well as the boaastful threats of o ther Arab 
leaders provided them  with the opportunity  to pu t these plans into 
effect. They exploited them  with great skill.
Because of the way in  which our inform ation m edia handled the 
crisis the picture has been distorted and many of the facts have 
been hidden. I t is certainly not common knowledge that Egypt’s 
attitude right through was one of m oderation towards Israel, that 
it made frequent attem pts to settle the differences, to find an 
accommodation w ith Israel. Nasser was constantly under pressure 
from demagogic Arab rulers for being soft on Israel. Despite Suez,
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Nasser’s policies since 1956 made U nited States imperialism the 
m ain target, while opposition to Israel was based on its connection 
w ith the U nited States and its support for US policies. This became 
more acute after the Greek m ilitary coup on April 21 1967 
Nasser, who was under growing pressure from the U nited 'S tates 
became convinced that this was a new stage in the American plans 
to remove the anti-im perialist governments in the Middle East
In  the confidential Inform ation Bulletin of the Central organisa­
tion of the Egyptian Socialist League, which is distributed to about 
100 top Egyptian functionaries onlv, it was stated:
After the regime in Athens, the Cypriot Government of Archbishon Makarios will probably be next. The Americans will try to establish a subservient government there, in order to strengthen their position in the eastern Mediterranean. After that they will attack Syria, which because of its isolated position is the weak link in the progressive Arab world The Baath regime in Damascus has not understood how to secure its position among the population. The ultimate aim of the Americans is the Nasser regime in Egypt.
A week after the Greek coup Nasser in his speech on May 1 
made a violent attack on the U nited States, accusing it 0f being 
the head of a world-wide counter-revolution.
A week later on May 8, two Syrian representatives arrived in 
Cairo to inform  Nasser th a t Israel was preparing a large-scale military 
operation to topple the regime in  Damascus. They asked for 
Nasser’s help. Nasser, who was suspicious of the Syrians and who 
feared that they wanted to push him  into a conflict with Israel 
replied that he would not promise anything un til he had checked 
their inform ation himself. T he two Syrians told him that their 
inform ation came from two sources; the Lebanese who were regarded 
as cautious and sober, and from their own information service which had sent some officers into Israel.
Nasser decided to get his own inform ation service to investigate 
the m atter and also to task the Soviet U nion if it believed that the 
Israelis at the behest of the U nited States were preparing for an 
offensive against the Syrian Government. T he  Soviet authorities 
confirmed that Israel was p lanning an attack on Syria and on Mav 
12 responsible Israelis themselves declared that they intended to 
topple the Syrian Governm ent in  order to p u t an end to the raids 
of Palestinian units. T h is was also stated publicly by the Israeli 
Chief of Staff, M. Rabin.
Nasser decided that the th reat was serious and required him to 
act to save the Syrian Governm ent from destruction. His. own 
inform ation service confirmed Israel’s intentions. He decided to 
take steps that he believed would frighten Israel and prevent it 
from proceeding w ith its plans to attack Syria. What did he do?
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Did he send this troops secretly to the border in order to prepare 
for a surprise attack on Israel? No, he m arched his troops openly 
with bands in broad daylight through Cairo, past the American 
Embassy. T he  whole thing had a theatrical touch about it. T he 
Americans understood that this was m eant to tell them  Egypt was 
prepared to defend Syria, and that w arned them  to restrain Israel 
from destroying the Syrian regime.
T he  Egyptian troops reach the border. Nasser takes the next 
step (of a purely local character) by asking, no t U T han t, bu t the 
Comm ander of the UN forces, G eneral Rikhye to withdraw his 
troops tem porarily from the border, un til the crisis is over. There 
is no suggestion that the UN forces should leave Egypt or that 
Egyptian troops should replace UN forces at Sham El-shekh. But 
what happens is that General Rikhye says he has not the authority 
to do this, “only President Nasser can p u t such a dem and to U 
T h a n t” . Nasser is compelled to ask U T h an t to withdraw the 
troops from the border. Even then he does not even m ention Sham 
El-shekh. But U T h a n t’s reaction is surprising. He says to Nasser 
that “if he wants the UN troops to leave the border he has to ask 
that all in ternational troops be removed from Egypt.” Nasser is 
caught. He has to ask for the withdrawal. Even then U T h an t 
acts with a strange rapidity. Nobody, least of all Nasser himself, 
expected this.
Why did U T h an t act in this unusual way? Two theories 
have been advanced. One is that he wanted to creat difficulties 
for the Americans in  order to force them  to scale down the war in 
Vietnam. T he  other is that the Americans had in  fact encouraged 
him  to act in  this speedy fashion to call Nasser’s bluff, and to 
damage his reputation. In  any case Nasser was now caught in a vise. 
I  or eleven years he has been under constant pressure to remove 
this rem nant of the Suez aggression of 1956. Now in the crisis 
he gives in to the pressure. He proves he is not an “accomplice 
of the Zionists” as his enemies have accused him.
Even then he tries to prevent the crisis from  growing. He accepts 
a request for a m eeting with U T h an t on May 22 in  Cairo. They 
leach a secret agreement to ease the tension. Nasser agrees to let 
ion-strategic m aterial through the G ulf of Aqaba. U T h an t under­
takes to ask the m aritim e nations to send strategic m aterials through 
H aifa (as before 1956) pending the settlem ent of the issue. T he 
Egyptians take still another step to avoid war. They offer “If 
the Israelis will publicly undertake not to attack Syria we are 
prepared to w ithdraw  our troops from the fron tier”.
A week later President Johnson sends Charles Yost as his personal 
representative to Cairo. T he visit is secret. He has a discussion with
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the Foreign ATinister M ahm ud Riad. They reach an agreement that 
(1) diplom atic efforts will continue to solve the problems in a 
peaceful way, (2) Egypt will raise no objections to the dispute 
being placed before the In ternational Court in the Hague, (3) 
Zakaria M uhieddin, the first vice-president of the Republic, will 
go to W ashington to work out an acceptable compromise. Charles 
Yost leaves Cairo on Saturday, June 3, two days before the start 
of the war. He leaves Nasser with the calm ing reassurance that 
Israel will not attack whilst negotiations continue.
Was the war necessary for Israel's survival? Certainly Israel’s 
leaders knew how weak and unprepared the Arabs were, how 
much all the threats am ounted to. How else is it to be explained 
that Ben G urion, the old warrior, was opposed to the war? W ould 
he have done so, if Israel was in m ortal danger? Of course, Ben 
G urion knew what the real position was. T he  war and its outcome 
has changed many things in the area. It has exposed the irre­
sponsibility and downright treachery of Arab chauvinism. I t has 
shown it as an instrum ent of those forces who w ant to subvert or 
destroy the Arab liberation movement. T he  war has also shown 
up the big weaknesses in the socio-economic structure of the Arab 
countries— the lim ited nature of the social changes, the existence 
of a privileged caste in the army, the reliance on nationalist dem a­
gogy as a substitute for the serious job of social reconstruction. 
There are some hopeful signs that some of these lessons are beginning 
to be learned.
T he tragedy is that at the very time when the Arabs after bitter 
lessons are beginning to th ink with their heads instead of their 
hearts, all too many people in Israel are th inking with their hearts 
instead of their heads. Yet the real friends of Israel are those who 
advise her to seek, even at this late hour, and despite all the 
difficulties, the only road that leads to a secure future— the road 
of conciliation and compromise, the road that seeks a settlem ent 
based on the rights of bo th  Jews and Arabs. Any other way can 
only lead to ultim ate disaster.
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